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Clergy Malpractice: Should Pennsylvania
Recognize a Cause of Action for Improper
Counseling by a Clergyman?
I. Introduction
In recent years, malpractice actions1 have firmly established
that psychotherapists2 may be held liable for professional negli-
gence.3 Members of the clergy are now being confronted with similar
actions based on alleged clerical malpractice. It appears a cause of
action against a clergyman is intended to remedy some alleged error
in the counsel or advice given by the cleric." The leading case estab-
lishing a cause of action for clergy malpractice is Nally v. Grace
Community Church of the Valley.' The Nally case has raised the
question of whether a court can impose judicial standards and duties
on pastoral counselors or whether their activity is protected from the
imposition of state control, review, or interference by the first
amendment.'
This Comment examines several significant issues in clergy mal-
practice actions. There are practical concerns involved in assigning
liability for professional negligence to clergymen. These concerns in-
1. The term 'malpractice' refers to a type of professional misconduct: the failure of one
rendering services in the practice of a profession to exercise that degree of skill and learning
normally applied by members of the profession in similar circumstances. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 299A (1977).
2. The psychotherapist's practice is most often compared to that of the clergyman's with
regard to counseling others. Some have suggested that the clergyman be held to the same
standard and duties as the psychotherapist. For a more in depth discussion of the developing
case law in this area see Comment, The Liability of Psychiatrists For Malpractice, 36 U. PITT
L. REV. 108 (1974) [hereinafter Comment, Liability of Psychiatrists].
3. The traditional elements necessary to state a cause of action in negligence are: 1) a
duty or obligation recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard
of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks; 2) a failure on his part to
conform to the standard required; 3) a reasonably close causal connection between the conduct
and the resulting injury; and 4) actual loss or damage to the interests of another. W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 14 (1964).
4. It should be noted at the outset that clergy malpractice actions are distinct from
intentional torts such as false imprisonment, battery, or assault. Clergymen are liable for their
intentional torts without regard for their professional status. Comment, Clergy Malpractice:
Bad News for the Good Samaritan or a Blessing in Disguise?, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 212
[hereinafter Comment, Bad News for the Good Samaritan]; for a more detailed discussion of
this distinction see infra note 18 and accompanying text.
5. 157 Cal. App.3d 912, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). Presently this is the
only case recognizing a cause of action for clergy malpractice.
6. See Note, I ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213 (1985), for an in depth analysis of the Nally decision.
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clude the difficulty of attempting to regulate and impose standards
upon pastoral counseling. Should a clergyman be held to the same
standards and resulting duties of psychotherapists? Should certain
educational requirements be imposed upon the clergy before they are
permitted to counsel others? With the advent of successful malprac-
tice actions, a need for insurance will undoubtedly arise. What impli-
cations will such insurance coverage have upon the traditional inti-
macy and privacy of clergy counseling? This Comment examines
these issues and analyzes their relationship to the free exercise and
establishment clause of the United States Constitution.7 It then ex-
plores the question of whether a cause of action against a clergyman
for alleged malpractice would violate Pennsylvania constitutional
standards as well as specific legislative enactments which provide
protection for the clergy. The Comment proposes that clergy mal-
practice for improper counseling is an unconstitutional intrusion into
the doctrinal, ecclesiastical, and spiritual realms of a clergyman. Ju-
dicial meddling in such areas is a violation of the first amendment
separation between church and state. Attempts to regulate and im-
pose standards upon pastoral counseling could open the courts to a
flood of clergy malpractice suits resulting in a chilling effect upon
the exercise of freedom of religion. In light of this conclusion, a look
ahead to a hypothetical Pennsylvania clergy malpractice action sug-
gests that such a cause of action would not and should not be al-
lowed in Pennsylvania.
II. Overview: The Cause of Action Against a Clergyman for Pro-
fessional Malpractice
A. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley
In Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley8 the plain-
tiffs, Walter and Maria Nally, alleged that the negligent counseling
of the defendant, Pastor MacArthur, resulted in the suicide of their
son, Ken. The plaintiffs asserted three claims: clergy malpractice,
negligence, and outrageous conduct. 9
In the first count, the plaintiffs claimed that Pastor MacArthur,
in his role as clergyman, exerted control and influence over Nally to
discourage him from seeking professional psychiatric or psychologi-
7. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
8. 157 Cal. App.3d 912, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
9. Also named in the suit were Leslie Rea, Lynn Cory, and Richard Thompson, all of
whom had counseled young Nally at various times. 157 Cal. App.3d at 918, 204 Cal. Rptr. at
309-310.
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cal care. The parents alleged that the pastor did so despite his
knowledge that Nally was seriously depressed and had suicidal ten-
dencies.10 As an alternate to medical treatment, MacArthur advised
Nally to consult with the church counselors, pray, read the Bible,
and listen to taped sermons." The plaintiffs alleged that MacAr-
thur's advice was negligent because it failed to meet the standard of
care for clergymen of his sect and training in the community. The
plaintiffs further alleged that MacArthur's negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of Nally's suicide."'
In count two, the plaintiffs charged Grace Church and Pastor
MacArthur with negligence in their failure to require proper psycho-
logical training for their spiritual counselors. It was also alleged that
MacArthur failed to make himself and staff counselors available at
Nally's request."
In the final count, Nally's parents accused the defendants of
outrageous conduct in that their counseling exacerbated Nally's pre-
existing feelings of guilt, anxiety, and depression by ridiculing his
parents' religious beliefs. 4 Count three further alleged that the de-
fendants exercised undue influence over Nally by requiring him to
spend time in isolation, thereby preventing him from contacting or
consulting with persons not affiliated with Grace Church.'
The trial court determined that the evidence failed to establish
a triable issue of fact with regard to the plaintiffs' cause of action for
wrongful death caused by the alleged intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. On appeal, however, the California Court of Appeals
reversed, stating that a jury might well find that the defendants did
engage in outrageous or extreme conduct by deliberately encourag-
ing Nally to commit suicide or by deliberately or recklessly increas-
10. Nally had attempted suicide several weeks prior to his interaction with Pastor Mac-
Arthur and the other defendants. Due to his depressed state of mind, Nally had visited a
physician who placed him on Elavil, an antidepressant drug. After his attempted suicide, Nally
was seen by psychiatrists. Although psychiatric hospitalization had been recommended,
Nally's parents resisted the suggestion. Nally was then placed in out-patient therapy. Id. at
922, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
II. Id. at 915, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 306. The taped sermons consisted of statements that
those who are suicidal but are "believers" will go to be with the Lord. In fact, one of the
suggestions on the tape was that suicide was one of the ways the Lord "takes home" a disobe-
dient believer. Id.
12. Id. at 918, 204 Cal. Rptr, at 309-310.
13. Id. at 918, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
14. Six years prior to his suicide, Nally had converted from Roman Catholicism to Prot-
estantism and joined the Grace Community Church of the Valley, which was also a defendant
in the case. Nally's conversion remained a source of tension in the family until his death. Id. at
922, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
15. Id. at 918, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
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ing his intense feelings of guilt with full knowledge of his past his-
tory. 6 The court also stated that remedies should exist for harm
caused by extreme and outrageous conduct even where such conduct
involves the expression of religious beliefs.17 In so deciding, the court
relied on cases that dealt with legally cognizable actions such as
child neglect, false imprisonment, drug use, and undue influence."s A
notable dissent in Nally pointed out the implications of allowing
such a cause of action:
To hold [that the church acted intentionally, or in such a
reckless manner as to constitute intentional conduct aimed at
causing injury] could have the deleterious effect of opening a
virtual Pandora's box of litigation by subjecting all the various
religious faiths and their clergy . . . to wrongful death actions
and experience full blown trials simply because they were unsuc-
cessful in their sincere efforts through spiritual counseling to
help or dissuade emotionally disturbed members of their congre-
gations who may be suicide prone from carrying out such a
predisposition."
Because of its conclusion that triable issues of fact remained as
to whether Nally's suicide was caused by the defendants' intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the court did not address the issue of
whether Pastor MacArthur had a duty to refer Nally to a psycho-
16. Id. at 918, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
17. The Nally court relied on two cases: Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal.3d 932, 603 P.2d
58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1974); and Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App.2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28
(Cal. Ct. App. 1960). In Agarwal an employee sued his former employer to recover damages
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Agarwal's employment was terminated without
warning or explanation causing him to suffer extreme emotional distress. In Tate, the widow
and children of Tate brought suit for damages alleging the defendants intentionally made
threats, statements, and accusations against the deceased for the purpose of harassing, embar-
rassing and humiliating him. These actions caused Tate to become physically and mentally
disturbed and finally to take his life. The thrust of these cases was that the element of intent in
a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is established by proof that the
defendant acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress. Nally,
157 Cal. App.3d at 915, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
18. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); United States v. Spears,
443 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972); Jehovah's Witnesses v.
King's County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967); O'Moore v. Driscoll, 135 Cal.
App. 770, 128 P.2d 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933); Nelson v. Dodge, 76 R.I. I, 68 A.2d 541 (1949).
19. 157 Cal. App.3d at 930, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (Hanson J. dissenting). The Judge
went on to note that:
[W]here the negligent wrong only causes a mental condition in which the in-
jured person is able to realize the nature of the act of suicide and has the power
to control it if he so desires, the act then becomes an independent intervening
force and the wrongdoer cannot be held liable . . . . On the other hand, if the
negligent wrong causes mental illness which results in an uncontrollable impulse
to commit suicide, then the wrongdoer may be held liable.
Id. at 928, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 319 (emphasis added).
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therapist or whether the Church had a duty to adequately train its
pastors in psychological counseling. 0 It is the resolution of these is-
sues which will inevitably have a large impact on whether clergy
malpractice actions are successful.
B. Psychotherapist v. Clergyman - The Search For a Standard
Jay Adams, a prominent authority on Christian counseling tech-
nique, writes:
Biblically, there is no warrant for acknowledging the exis-
tence of a separate and distinct discipline called psychiatry. This
self-appointed caste came into being with the broadening of the
medical umbrella to include inorganic illness. A new practi-
tioner, part physician and part secular priest, came into being to
serve the host of persons who previously were counseled by min-
isters. The two general goals and methods of psychiatrists and
Christian ministers are identical, clearly revealing the overlap.
First, both want to change behavior, emotions, and character.
Second, both attempt this through value, attitude and behavioral
change.2
Adams concludes that the psychiatrist should return to the practice
of medicine, which is his only legitimate sphere of activity, and that
the minister should return to the God-given work from which he has
been ousted.2
Adams' writings succinctly analyze one of the issues presented
by a clergy malpractice action. Although counseling is a traditional
part of the clergyman's role, it is not a function unique to the clergy-
man. 23 Subsequently, the argument has been presented that the stan-
dards and duties applied to psychotherapists may be relied upon in
developing counseling standards for clergymen. 2 Those who sub-
20. Id. at 918, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 309. The case was remanded for trial. At trial the court
granted the defendant's motion for nonsuit. The court found the defendants had no legally
recognizable duty under the law to 1) investigate Ken Nally's alleged suicidal manifestations;
2) inform other professionals and his family of his suicidal manifestations; 3) refer Ken Nally
to a psychologist or psychiatrist or other professional; 4) train and employ competent counsel-
ors to secular standards; and 5) make counselors available to Ken Nally. Nally v. Grace Com-
munity Church of the Valley, No. NCC 18668-B slip. op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles
County, May 16, 1985) (Reported in 5 Religious Reporter 91 (1985)). The plaintiffs have
appealed from this order and the matter is now pending before the Court of Appeals of the
State of California.
21. J. Adams, THE CHRISTIAN COUNSELOR'S MANUAL 9 (1973).
22. Id. at 10.
23. Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN
FERN. U. L. REv. 47, 57 (1981) [hereinafter Bergman].
24. See, e.g., Bernstein, A Potential Peril of Pastoral Care: Malpractice, 19 J. RELIG.
AND HEALTH 46 (Spring 1980) [hereinafter Bernstein].
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scribe to this argument perceive pastoral counseling as separable
from other, more obviously religious functions of the cleric25 and
more closely aligned with counseling performed by psychiatrists and
psychologists."6
Proponents of a cause of action against clerics for professional
negligence in counseling assert that comparable standards should ap-
ply. They believe that the difference between pastoral counseling and
psychotherapy is one of orientation only.2 The argument is that the
process of pastoral counseling implies a relationship between the pas-
toral counselor and counselee which gives rise to duties similar to
those which exist in the psychiatrist/psychologist-patient relation-
ship.28 In their separation of pastoral counseling from a cleric's other
functions, proponents of this view suggest that an analysis of a psy-
chiatric malpractice action will provide viable guidelines for a stan-
dard of care applicable to the clergy.29
Further, subscribers to this argument suggest that since the un-
derlying purpose of such standards is to better enable the clergyman
to recognize the warning signs of serious mental illness, a minimum
requirement of supervised clinical training would best achieve this
goal.30 They suggest that a minimum of two years experience under
the supervision of a licensed counselor, either a psychologist or psy-
chiatrist, be required. This requirement would not pose a hardship
for the majority of the religious community since many seminary
curriculums now require both academic and field courses in pastoral
25. Comment, Made Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy
Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W.L. REv. 507 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Clergy
Malpractice].
26. See Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 514. Those who subscribe to
this position overlook the fact that the type of counseling performed by pastoral clergy, though
related to the disciplines of the secular counselors, is unique to clerics. Id. at 514-520.
27. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 517.
28. Id. at 518.
29. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 519. The author notes that a re-
view of the reported cases of alleged psychiatric malpractice reveals that the majority of such
cases involve the mishandling of chemical therapies, physical therapies, wrongful commitment
or failure to adequately supervise institutionalized patients. The author's research revealed
only two cases of psychiatric malpractice involving the content of a therapist's counsel. Those
cases are Landau v. Werner, 205 Sol. J. 257 (A.B.), affd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (C.A. 1961), and
Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968). In both cases the psychiatrist mishandled the
transferee phenomenon when the patient fell in love with him. See also Ericsson, Clergyman
Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 172 n.21 (1981) [here-
inafter Ericsson], where the author's research uncovered no cases involving psychiatric mal-
practice for alleged improper counseling. Additional research has uncovered no such cases in
the last decade.
30. Comment, Bad News for the Good Samaritan, supra note 4, at 247. But see J.
Adams, supra note 21, at 13. Adams argues that qualifications for a Christian counselor may
be summed up as extensive knowledge of the scriptures, divine wisdom, and good will toward
others.
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psychology.$' Proponents conclude that allowing a clergyman to
practice his counseling with total disregard for the scientific ad-
vances made in diagnostic and therapeutic techniques poses too great
a threat to the public welfare."5
Conversely, some commentators suggest that pastoral counsel-
ing specifically involves the application of religious insights into day
to day problems such as difficulties in marriage, parenthood, employ-
ment, and other relationships to produce new religious understanding
and thereby change the counselee.33 To the extent that a pastor's
duties are derived from his religious ministry, they argue it would be
an improper function of the courts to set standards for the conduct
of his mission. Furthermore, a universal standard of care for clergy-
men would be exceedingly difficult to establish. The style and con-
tent of the advice of one pastor will no doubt differ from that of
another as each is influenced by the theological concepts to which he
adheres.3 4 The diversity of religious beliefs makes it practically im-
possible to define a universal standard with sufficient precision to
measure the cleric's conduct. 5
There are difficulties involved in establishing a standard of care
for malpractice actions against psychiatrists despite the fact that
there are relatively few differing doctrines in the psychiatry field. In
contrast, there are hundreds of varying theologies and doctrines in
the religious realm.36 If a court chose to delve into these varying
doctrines and theologies, problems would inevitably arise as to which
of the competing doctrines the court should choose. Moreover, the
problem of identifying the exact scope and nature of church-related
activity would remain. A duty owed by a counselor may vary de-
pending upon the counselor's ecclesiastical office and the authority or
function flowing from such office.3 7 Since, to date, psychiatry has not
3 1. Comment, Bad news for the Good Samaritan, supra note 4, at 247.
32. Bergman, supra note 23, at 58-9.
33. Braceland & Farnsworth, Psychiatry and Religion, in PSYCHIATRY, THE CLERGY
AND PASTORAL COUNSELING 5-6 (D. Farnsworth & F. Braceland eds. 1969).
34. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 520. It is interesting to note that
as of 1986 there are at least 156 separate religious bodies in the United States. THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACT 1986, at 35-6 (1985).
35. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 521.
36. Comment, Liability of Psychiatrists, supra note 2, at 123. See also Ericsson, supra
note 29, at 170. Ericsson argues that adding to the problems of diverse sects is the possibility
that different standards of care may be needed for different levels of ministry.
37. Ericsson, supra note 29, at 170. Ericsson notes that, for example, the Roman Catho-
lic Church has nuns, mother superiors, brothers, fathers, priests, bishops, cardinals, and the
Pope. Protestants have evangelists, pastors, elders, deacons, deaconesses, youth ministers and
Sunday school teachers. Other religions have their apostles, prophets, rabbis, vicars, divine
mauters, seers, and even presidents. Id.
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clearly defined the skills, knowledge, and attitudes that the psychia-
trist in training must demonstrate in order to be certified as compe-
tent, 38 the court can not reasonably review the training and compe-
tence of individual religious counselors, even if the counselors have
obtained a degree in clinical psychology.
Inevitably, the court must conclude that clerical counseling
deals with spiritual issues and is a fundamentally religious activity.
Standards of care applicable to psychotherapists provide little or no
assistance.3 9 Since counseling is only one of the many duties of the
clergyman, courts can not require the same level of knowledge and
competence from the clergyman as is expected from the psychiatrist
whose training is more specialized."0
C. Potential Conflicts: Duty to Insurer vs. Duty to Parishioner
Recognition of a cause of action for clergy malpractice will ne-
cessitate that the clergy protect themselves by procuring liability in-
surance. In the spring of 1979, members of the insurance industry
foresaw the recognition of a clergy malpractice tort, and for the first
time offered malpractice insurance to the clergy."' Three major
Christian denominations now have or provide malpractice insur-
ance.42 This insurance,43 however, raises the question of whether
such insulative4 4 techniques would damage or destroy the value of
pastoral counseling. Those who oppose clergy malpractice actions
,suggest that the intimacy between the clergyman and parishioner is
lost when such techniques are utilized.45 Recognition of clergy mal-
38. Id. at 171.
39. Id. at 169-70. Practical examples of the problems encountered in establishing a
"psychotherapist" type of duty for the clergy include: "Whether crisis intervention-type coun-
seling involves the same duty as ongoing therapy; whether the clergymen owe the same duty to
both members and non-members of their congregation; and when the clergyman-counselee
duty has commenced.
40. Bergman, supra note 23, at 62.
41. Marty, Ministerial Malpractice, 96 CHRISTIAN CENT. 511 (1979).
42. The United Presbyterian Church, the United Methodist Church, and the Lutheran
Church in America, all provide malpractice insurance for their clergy.
43. In today's "litigation happy society," such insurance is a natural precaution. See
Holy Terror: Clergy Buying Insurance, 60 A.B.A. J. 1206 (1982). But see Breecher, Ministe-
rial Malpractice: Is it a Reasonable Fear? 16 TRIAL 11-14 (July 1980), where none of the
insurance companies could refer the inquiring reporter to any cases which would apply in a
clergy malpractice action where the insurance was of any use to the policy holder, leaving the
reporter to wonder why a minister would reasonably believe such coverage is necessary.
44. Other insulative techniques include consultations with attorneys, insistence upon
contract relations, and releases wherever third parties are to be consulted or when treatment is
terminated. Bernstein, A Potential Peril of Pastoral Care: Malpractice, 19 J. RELIG. AND
HEALTH 46, 57 (Spring 1980).
45. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 521.
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practice may pressure clergymen into disclosing the contents of con-
fidential communications to members of the counselee's family or
others."' This argument is supported by the well-settled rule that an
insured has a duty to cooperate with his insurer in defending a law-
suit."' A clergyman who refuses to disclose confidential communica-
tions that are vital to defending an action may violate his duty to
cooperate with his insurer, thereby releasing the insurer from its
duty to defend the suit." Thus, in order to obtain a proper defense,
the clergyman will be compelled to violate his counselee's confidence.
Historically, the law has recognized certain types of communi-
cations as privileged from disclosure. Included in this category have
been communications between a clergyman and a penitent."' Most
states have specific statutes designed to protect this clergyman-peni-
tent privilege, 0 however, the relationship must meet certain require-
ments to qualify for protection. The foremost of these is that the
communication must be made to the clergyman in the course of dis-
cipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs or in the course
of discipline enjoined by rules of practice of his denomination. In
addition, the communication must be made to the clergyman in his
professional capacity. 5 The fact that this legally-recognized privi-
lege exists at all, is further evidence that clergyman counseling is
qualitatively different from that of the psychotherapist. It is equally
clear that the requirements of malpractice insurance would place the
clergyman in a precarious position, since the duty to cooperate with
the insurer conflicts with his moral duty to keep confidential the
communications of the counselee.
Further, the requirements of insurance coverage may impose a
duty to refer the insured minister's most difficult problems to profes-
sional specialists such as psychologists, psychiatrists, or other mental
health workers.52 Proponents of allowing a cause of action against
the clergy for improper counseling acknowledge that a duty to refer
would accompany the imposition of liability. They argue, however,
that the clergyman may fulfill his duty to refer without violating his
46. Ericsson, supra note 29, at 174.
47. See, e.g., Vallado v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co., 13 Cal.2d 322, 89 P.2d 643
(1939).
48. Ericsson, supra note 29, at 174.
49. See generally Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIo ST. L.J.
55 (1963).
50. See infra note 106.
51. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA
C.L. REV. 95, 121 (1983).
52. Ericsson, supra note 29, at 175.
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duty to keep the communication confidential by simply withholding
absolution until the penitent has voluntarily attempted to seek
outside counseling based on a list of "experts" the clergyman would
provide. 53 They conclude that clergy malpractice liability would not
undermine the clergy-penitent privilege for three reasons. First, a
flood of litigation is not expected to result.54 Second, clergymen can
take steps to protect the anonymity of their parishioners when exer-
cising their referral obligations. Third, the existence of professional
malpractice in the areas of law and medicine have not destroyed the
effectiveness of the attorney-client and doctor-patient privileges.55
These arguments, however, ignore the unique nature of the role
of a clergyman. In the Christian religion, for example, the role of a
pastor is often described as that of a shepherd caring for his troub-
led, discouraged, and fearful flock. 56 The pastor is obligated to pro-
tect those in his care from counsel that might undermine their
faith.5 7 In any given case, there may be no professional psychiatrist,
psychologist, or other mental health worker available who is support-
ive of the doctrinal stance of the church." It is untenable to impose
a legal duty on churches and their clergy to refer troubled parishio-
ners to professionals who may be hostile to their members' faith.
III. Constitutional and State Statutory Restrictions on the Imposi-
tion of Liability on Pastoral Counselors
A. Constitutional Restrictions
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."59 The amendment
prohibits federal and state60 interferences with the practice of reli-
53. Comment, Bad News for the Good Samaritan, supra note 4, at 250. Clergymen
need not mention the names of parishioners during consultation sessions. In the alternative, a
clergyman may provide the parishioner with a list of several mental health professionals from
which he may choose, giving the parishioner the final choice in terms of referral. Id.
54. But see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
55. Comment, Bad News for the Good Samaritan, supra note 4, at 251.
56. Ericsson, supra note 29, at 175.
57. id.
58. Id.
59. U.S. CONST. amend I. This language is referred to respectively as the "establish-
ment" and "free exercise" clauses. The amendment reads in full: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances."
60. The first amendment guarantees of freedom of religion and separation of church and
state were made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939).
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gious faith and prohibits the establishment of a state religion.61 A
closer look at the amendment, however, indicates that the rights
guaranteed by the religion clauses are not without limits.
Early litigation involving the religion clauses focused primarily
on judicial intervention in religious conflicts. In the leading case of
Watson v. Jones," rival factions of a Presbyterian congregation dis-
agreed over who should take possession of property held by the con-
gregation. The parent church awarded the land to one of the fac-
tions. The other faction then sought a contrary decision in the civil
courts." The United States Supreme Court ruled that such an in-
quiry by a civil court might be proper only if a church tribunal had
attempted to punish a church member by imprisonment or death or
attempted interference with the individual property rights of its
members. Such an inquiry, however, would not be permitted where
the dispute was purely ecclesiastical in nature.6 ' The Court con-
cluded that a secular court has no jurisdiction to review ecclesiastical
tribunal decisions or religious matters.65 Such review would imper-
missibly interfere with the authority of a church to construe its own
rules. 66
The Court expanded those areas beyond the realm of state con-
trol in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral7 and Presbyterian Church
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church.6" In Kedroff, a
property dispute between factions of the Russian Orthodox church
was brought into the secular court system. This case was the first
involving a dispute between factions of a religious group to come
before the Supreme Court since it had held that the first amend-
ment's religion clauses were applicable to the states. The Court ruled
that a New York statute which declared a faction of the Russian
Orthodox Church to be the owner of a cathedral, violated the free
exercise clause because it interfered with the decision making ability
of the church.6 9 The court emphasized that a religious organization's
61. See generally J. NOVAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1028-81
(2d ed. 1983), for an overview of the first amendment religion clauses and their impact.
62. 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 679 (1871).
63. Kentucky common law had held that civil courts could always inquire whether an
ecclesiastical tribunal had acted within its jurisdiction. The lower courts, therefore, found the
suit proper for state determination. Id. at 687.
64. Id. at 733.
65. Id. The court also stated that a secular court has no jurisdiction to hear questions of
discipline, faith, ecclesiastical rule, custom or law.
66. Id. at 737.
67. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
68. 393 U.S. 440 (1962).
69. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115-6.
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freedom from state control extends not only to church governing pol-
icies, but matters of faith and doctrine as well.
7 0
In Hull Church, two local churches voted to withdraw from
their parent church as a result of a doctrinal dispute. The parent
church responded by taking the property of the two dissident
churches. One of the churches then sued in a state court to enjoin
the parent church from trespassing on the property.1 The Supreme
Court decided that any excursion into ecclesiastical issues7" on the
part of secular courts would entail a forbidden process of interpret-
ing and weighing church doctrine. 3
Kedroff and Hull Church established a policy under which sec-
ular courts have a duty to withhold all judgment when purely eccle-
siastical or doctrinal matters are involved. In United States v. Bal-
lard,7 ' however, the Supreme Court approved a judicial inquiry into
the sincerity of a person's beliefs. In this case, the Ballard family
represented to the public that they could, by virtue of supernatural
powers, cure diseases which the medical profession had classified as
incurable. 75 The Ballards were convicted in a federal court for using
and conspiring to use the mails to defraud. The Supreme Court, in
affirming the conviction, held that a judicial inquiry into whether the
Ballards honestly and in good faith believed their claims to be true
70. Id. at 116. It is interesting to note that eight years later the same parties came
before the Supreme Court in Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960). In that
case a lower court ruled that the American faction of the Russian Orthodox Church owned the
disputed cathedral. The Court held the Kedroff decision to be controlling, and found the re-
straints of the free exercise clause applicable to judicial actions as well as legislative actions.
71. 393 U.S. at 443. Georgia law recognized a "departure from doctrine" theory which
allowed a secular court to determine whether actions of a parent church constituted a "sub-
stantial departure" from the tenets of the faith and practice existing at the time of the local
church's affiliation. If so, the court could terminate an implied trust in favor of the parent
church which would otherwise exist. Id. at 449-50.
72. As to what exactly amounts to ecclesiastical issues that courts should avoid, the
California Supreme Court in Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Nonsectarian Church, 39
Cal.2d 121, 245 P.2d 481 (1952), provided the following summary:
The courts of the land are not concerned with mere polemic discussions and
cannot coerce the performance of obligations of a spiritual character, or adopt a
judicial standard for theological orthodoxy, or determine the abstract truth of
religious doctrines . . . or settle mere questions of faith or doctrine, or make
changes in the clergy, or dictate the policy of a church in the seating of the sexes
or the playing of instrumental music, or decide who the rightful leader of a
church ought to be, or enjoin clergymen from striking the complainant's name
from the register of communications.
Id. at 131-32, 245 P.2d at 487-88 (citations omitted).
73. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 451.
74. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
75. Guy and Edna Ballard and their son, Donald, founded a movement known as "I
am." They claimed that they had cured hundreds of persons of these incurable diseases. Id. at
79-80.
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was allowable.e Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas stated
that the first amendment does, however, prohibit the courts from ex-
amining the truth of religious representations:
The (first) amendment embraces two concepts - freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be. Freedom of thought,
which includes freedom of religious belief ...embraces the
right to maintain theories of life and death and of the hereafter
which are ranked heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths
... .Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not
be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Reli-
gious experiences which are as real as life to some may be in-
comprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond
the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect
before the law. Many take their gospel from the New Testa-
ment. But it would hardly be supposed that they could be tried
before a jury charged with the duty of determining whether
these teachings contained false representation. The miracles of
the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the
power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If
one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment
found these teachings false, little indeed would be left of reli-
gious freedoms .. . .The religious views espoused by [the Bal-
lards] might seem incredible, if not preposterous to most people.
But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged
with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done
with the religious beliefs of any sect . . . .When the triers of
fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain."
Justice Douglas' analysis applies with equal force to clergy mal-
practice cases. The first amendment protects the communication of
beliefs that can not be proven and that "might seem incredible, if
not preposterous to most people."'' 8 The teaching of Ballard is that
the only issue for secular courts in cases which involve religious be-
liefs is whether the asserted beliefs were sincerely held .7 The Court
has generally, however, been reluctant to follow the sweeping words
of Justice Douglas and has, instead, established tests for determining
whether there is a state violation of the establishment and free exer-
cise clauses.
It is a well established principle that the action of state courts
76. Id. at 81.
77. Id. at 86-87 (citations omitted).
78. Id.
79. Ericsson, supra note 29, at 178.
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and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as
action of the state within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment.80 Application of this principle to a judicially-created cause of
action for clergy malpractice requires that the action conform to the
dictates of the first amendment. In Lemon v. Kurtzman," the Su-
preme Court established a three-prong test for evaluating whether
state action violates the establishment clause. First, the purpose of
the action must be clearly secular; second, the primary effect of the
action must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and third, the activ-
ity must not result in excessive state entanglement with religion.82
Under the three-prong Lemon test, the imposition of a standard
of care for clergymen is unconstitutional. Recognition of a clergy
malpractice action would require the courts to delineate a standard
which would be utilized to determine if malpractice has been com-
mitted. Undoubtedly, this standard of care would be based on the
secular purpose of enforcing levels of conduct so that alleged wrongs
may be redressed.88 The validity of such a purpose becomes increas-
ingly questionable, however, when one examines the nature of cleric
counseling. The clergyman applies religious ideals to the problems of
everyday life; his counseling is a religious matter and not one of sec-
ular concern.
The enforcement of a judicial standard of care would hinder the
ability of a religious sect to direct and control the establishment of
supervisory models for the clergy.84 It is the role of particular de-
nominations, seminaries and training programs to do this. Further-
more, imposition of a judicial standard may diminish the value of
pastoral counseling by inhibiting the intimacy clergymen depend
upon for their effectiveness as counselors.85
Most importantly, pastoral counseling is a religious activity not
unlike prayer and preaching. As such, it can not be made subject to
a secular court's standard of conduct. Such a standard would, of ne-
cessity, involve secular approval, disapproval, and regulation or con-
80. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
81. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, a Rhode Island statute established a fifteen percent
salary supplement to be paid to teachers in nonpublic schools. Schools could use the supple-
ment for salaries, textbooks, and instructional material, provided that they agreed not to teach
a course in religion. The statute was declared unconstitutional because its administration in-
volved excessive entanglement between government and religion. Id.
82. Id. at 612-13. See also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), rehearing denied, 449
U.S. 1104 (1981) (reiterating the Lemon-three-prong test).
83. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 330-31.
84. Shurman, Supervising the Pastoral Counselor, 1 J. SUPERVISION & TRAINING IN
MINISTRY, 63, 64 (1978).
85. Bernstein, supra note 24, at 57.
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trol of pastoral advice given in private.86 Such an examination of
clearly religious matters would result in excessive state entangle-
ment, thus violating the third prong of the Lemon test.
8 7
Clergy malpractice actions also involve the potential for viola-
tion of the constitutional protections of the counselor's right to freely
exercise the religion of his or her choice. The constitutional analysis
applied to legislative actions involving state interference of the free-
exercise clause may be helpful in predicting the constitutionality of a
court-created cause of action for clergy malpractice. In determining
whether legislative action is violative of the free-exercise clause, Su-
preme Court decisions have suggested a two-prong analysis.
The first prong of the test was stated in Abington School Dis-
trict v. Schempp.88 In this case, the Court ruled that a person who
alleges government interference must show the coercive effect of the
governmental action as it operates against the individual in his or
her religion.89 If the action is shown to be coercive, a second level of
analysis is suggested by the decision of Sherbert v. Verner.9° Here,
the focus is on whether the interference is justified because the regu-
lated activity poses some substantial threat to public safety, peace,
86. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 532. There are at least two cases
to support this proposition: Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); and Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67 (1952). In Engel a New York school board prescribed the use of a non-sectarian
form of prayer to be used voluntarily in public schools at the beginning of each day. The
Supreme Court, in ruling that the board's prayer was prohibited from being further recited,
admonished the state and federal governments to "Leave ... religious functions to the people
themselves and to those the people choose to look for religious guidance." Engle, 370 U.S. at
435. In Fowler, a Jehovah's witness was penalized under a municipal ordinance for preaching
at a peaceful religious meeting in a public park. The Court ruled that it was not within the
competence of courts under our constitutional scheme to approve, disapprove, regulate, or in
any manner control sermons delivered at religious meetings. Fowler, 345 U.S. at 70. Any
secular court's prescription and use of a standard against which the style and content of a
pastor's counseling is measured is contrary to the holdings in these cases. Comment, Clergy
Malpractice, supra note 25, at 533.
87. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 533.
88. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). In Schempp, a Pennsylvania law required that at least ten
verses from the Bible be read without comment at the opening of each public school day. Any
child could be excused from such Bible reading upon the written request of his parent or
guardian. The Supreme Court held the statute to be an unconstitutional violation of the first
amendment.
89. Id. at 223.
90. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In this case Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist
Church, was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on a
Saturday, which was the Sabbath for members of her faith. Sherbert was unable to obtain
other employment because she would not work on Saturdays. Subsequently, she filed for unem-
ployment compensation under a South Carolina law which provided that a claimant is ineligi-
ble for benefits if he or she has failed, without good cause, to accept available suitable work
when offered. Her benefits were denied because she refused to work on Saturdays. The Su-
preme Court ruled that her disqualification for benefits imposed an unconstitutional burden on
her free exercise of religion and that the state had no compelling interest which justified the
substantial infringement of her rights under the first amendment.
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and order."
It appears that a clergy malpractice action would fail constitu-
tional analysis under this two-prong test. The establishment of a
standard of care for the clergyman counselor would render him lia-
ble for deviation from that standard.92 This prospect of liability
would compel adherence to the standard and restrain individual ac-
tion, which, by definition, amounts to coercion.93
Under the second prong of the analysis, it appears that the state
would have to establish that clerical counseling endangers the public
welfare to such an extent as to warrant state regulation. The fact
that there is precedent for holding that activity based on religious
doctrine may be disruptive of public order is not relevant for pur-
poses of cleric malpractice."4 In such cases, the focus was on the
actions and not the underlying religious beliefs. The contrary is true
in a clergy malpractice action where courts would be forced to focus
on the religious organization's theological principles and doctrines.
By defining a standard of care, the courts would not only be involved
in spiritual or doctrinal inquiry, but would also be forced to separate
the religious impetus and content of the counsel from the conduct of
giving the counsel. 95 Certainly the court could not achieve this task
without violating the free exercise clause.
Proponents of clergy malpractice actions argue that the govern-
ment's interest in providing redress for mental and physical injury
resulting from negligent pastoral counseling outweighs an individ-
91. Id. at 403.
92. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 536.
93. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (5th ed. 1979) defines "coercion" as:
Compulsion; constraint; compelling by force or arms or threat. It may be
actual, direct, or positive, as where physical force is used to compel an act
against one's will, or implied, legal, or constructive, as where one party is con-
strained by subjugation to others to do what his free will would refuse. As used
in testamentary law, any pressure by which testator's action is restrained against
his free will in the execution of his testament. "Coercion" that vitiates confession
can be mental as well as physical, and question is whether accused was deprived
of his free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer.
94. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (Christian Scientists' ob-
jections to required vaccination overruled); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (prohibition
of Mormon practice of polygamy upheld); Baugh v. Thomas, 56 N.J. 203, 265 A.2d 675
(1970) (wrongful expulsion from church can constitute a serious emotional deprivation); Peo-
ple v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903) (parents failing to provide medical care for
their children on grounds of religious belief held subject to criminal prosecution). But see
Radecki v. Schuckhart, 50 Ohio App.2d 92, 361 N.E.2d 543 (1976) (religious sect has lawful
right to solicit members and to express views and give religious counsel provided there is noth-
ing unlawful, improper, or immoral in such authority); Bradeski v. Antion, 21 Ohio App.2d 67,
255 N.E.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1969) (right to advocate and disseminate religious faith through
counseling is guaranteed by the Constitution).
95. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 540.
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ual's religious rights." If this premise is true, the free exercise clause
fails to provide a constitutional impediment to clergy malpractice
actions.91
It appears that the arguments against a recognition of a cause
of action for clergy malpractice are more cogent that those which
favor the imposition of liability. Recognition of a cause of action for
clergy malpractice will inevitably lead to violations of the free exer-
cise and establishment clauses by requiring a court to approve state
regulations based on religious tenets. A court would be restricting
religion and controlling religious conduct without the necessary
countervailing balance of a secular purpose. 8 This is the unavoida-
ble result of all attempts to establish any standard of care because
any standard chosen would, by definition, require courts to examine
matters of religious doctrine. 9 Pastoral counseling involves attempts
to sanctify souls and bring persons into a relationship with God; it is
clearly a religious endeavor.100 A judicially established standard of
care for this endeavor will introduce restraints on what is, in fact, a
religious activity.
Pastoral guidance rarely, if ever, involves disruption of the pub-
lic order and peace.' 01 Thus, a secular court's enforcement of a stan-
dard of care for clergyman counseling will impinge upon the consti-
tutional rights of both pastors and their flocks by abridging their
freedoms under the first amendment. Additionally, there is the po-
tential that any state regulation in this area would violate the consti-
tutional mandate of church-state separation and raise serious ques-
tions of public policy.10
2
B. State Legislative Enactments and Public Policy
Many states, through legislative enactments, have exempted
clergymen from state regulation.0 3 California, for example, exempts
clergymen from licensing requirements for marriage, family, child,
and domestic counseling.0 California has also exempted clergymen
96. Comment, Bad News for the Good Samaritan, supra note 4, at 225.
97. Id. at 226.
98. See Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 526.
99. Id.
100. G. WHITLOCK. PREVENTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CHURCH 21 (1973).
101. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 544. See also, supra note 94, and
accompanying text.
102. Id.
103. Bergman, supra note 23, at 51.
104. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17800.1 (West Supp. 1981) (currently codified at Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 4981.01) (West Supp. 1987). The act provides in part; "[T]hat this act
shall not apply to any priest, rabbi, or minister of the gospel of any religious denomination
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from the licensing requirements imposed on persons who provide
mental health care. 10 5
Forty-six states and the District of Columbia have recognized
the clergy-penitent privilege which protects the right of a clergyman
to refuse to disclose confidential information which he receives.10 6
Not all statements made to a clergyman, however, are privileged.
There is a universal statutory requirement that the protected com-
munication be made to the clergyman in his professional capacity.
107
Some courts have imposed an additional requirement that the pro-
tected communication must be made for the purpose of seeking reli-
gious or spiritual advice.' 08
Additional requirements of the privilege are that the communi-
cations at issue be penitential 09 in character." 0 Also, statutes in
when performing counseling services as part of his pastoral or professional duties." One com-
mentator, however, points out that a recent amendment to the California statute requiring
licensing for marriage, family, and child counselors has distinguished between the clergyman's
counseling function as part of his pastoral duties and private counseling apart from church
connected activities. See Bergman, supra note 23, at 52. The amended section also imposes
more strict educational requirements, which seem to indicate that the state's reluctance to
regulate counseling extends only as far as such activities relate to religious duties. See Com-
ment, Bad News for the Good Samaritan, supra note 4, at 227.
105. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 4996.13 (West Supp. 1987).
106. The states which have enacted statutes are: ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1982);
ALASKA R. EVID. 506; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062 (1982); ARK. R. EVID.
505; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-1034 (West 1966); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West Supp. 1985); DEL. R. EvID. 505; D.C. CODE ANN. §
14-309 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1982);
IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §
622.10 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.210
(1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.477 (West 1987); ME. R. EvID. 505; MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1986); MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 1987); MIcH.
CoMP. LAWS § 600.2156 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1-804 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255 (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.35 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1986);
N.M.R. EVID. 11-506; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4505 (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-53.2 (1986); N.D.R. EVID. 505; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-17-23 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 19-13-16 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
31.18 (Vernon Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1607 (1973); VA. CODE § 8.01-400 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp.
1987); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975); Wvo. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1986).
107. See, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 105 App. D.C. 25, 263 F.2d 275 (1958); In Re
Verploak, 329 F. Supp. 433 (D.C. Cal. 1971); Lucy v. State, 443 So.2d 1335 (Ala. App.
1983); Wainscott v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1978).
108. See generally Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privi-
lege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1985).
109. "Penitential" is defined as "relating to being in the state of sorrow for one's sins; a
sad and humble realization of and regret for one's misdeeds." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 847 (1976).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (2nd Cir. 1981) (conversa-
tions relating to business relationships, not spiritual matters are admissible in court); Mullen v.
United States, 263 F.2d 275, 277 (U.S. App. D.C. 1958) (confessions made to a minister by a
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many states require that the communications to the clergyman be
made in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the
clergyman belongs.111 Finally, although not specifically mentioned in
any of the various state statutes, the necessity that the communica-
tion be intended as confidential has been recognized as a condition of
the privilege." 2
The exact scope of the clergy-penitent privilege and the particu-
lar matters of communication encompassed by it are difficult to de-
fine in precise terms. For example, confessions or admissions of sin
or guilt may, or may not, be privileged depending upon various fac-
tors. These factors include whether the communications were made
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church and whether they
were made to a clergyman in his professional character.113 So too,
results have differed in various cases involving statements made to,
or in the presence of third parties."' In addition, the question of
whether statements made to clergymen in the course of marriage
counseling are privileged has been answered differently in various ju-
risdictions.1 5 There does, however, appear to be general agreement
mother who abused her children were made as a penitent in confession and are privileged);
Lucy v. State, 443 So.2d 1335, 1340 (Ala. App. 1983) (testimony of minister properly admit-
ted as testimony where minister arrived at murder scene and defendant stated he had "severely
cut his girlfriend"); Radecki v. Schuckardt, 50 Ohio App.2d 92, 97, 361 N.E.2d 543, 546
(1976) (court did not err in admitting as evidence the conversation between wife and plaintiff
and bishop since the testimony did not refer to a confession).
Ill. These states are Arizona, California, Colorado, D.C., Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478 (2nd Cir. 1981) (conversations
relating to business relationships, not spiritual matters, are admissible in court); United States
v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4 (2nd Cir. 1971) letter from defendant to priest which contained no hint
that its contents were to be kept secret was admissible in court); Perry v. State, 280 Ark. 36,
-, 655 S.W.2d 380, 381 (1983) (any privilege defendant might have claimed with respect
to inculpatory statements made to minister was waived by defendant's act of disclosing the
statement to several others); State v. Berry, 324 So.2d 822, 828 (La. 1975) (communication to
minister by defendant in front of two others that he had recently killed someone was not
privileged).
113. See generally Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent
Privileges - The Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. PITrs. L. REv. 27 (1967).
114. See, e.g., State v. Kurtz, 564 S.W.2d 856, 860 (Mo. 1978) (testimony of priest who
spoke with defendant at police station was not inadmissible as violative of sacred privilege
between priest and parishioner where it was based on personal observations as distinguished
from communication); State v. Berry, 324 So.2d 822 (La. 1975) (communications to a minis-
ter by defendant in front of two others that he had recently killed someone was not privileged).
115. See. e.g., Pardie v. Pardie, 158 N.W.2d 641 (Iowa 1968) (statement made by
plaintiff to clergyman with respect to marital difficulties was improperly admitted into evi-
dence); People v. Pecora, 107 III. App.2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 865 (1969) (in prosecution of de-
fendant for killing his ex-wife, clergyman did not have to answer questions relating to conver-
sations between himself and the defendant); Spencer v. Spencer, 61 N.C. App. 535, 539, 301
S.E.2d 411, 413 (1983) (husband's disclosure of his extra-marital affairs in front of wife dur-
ing marriage counseling sessions with a minister is not admissible).
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that the privilege does flot apply to church baptismal records and
similar documents, or to records of church-related organizations.""
It appears that a clergy malpractice action would involve a vio-
lation of specific legislative enactments designed to protect the
clergy. Exemption provisions such as those enacted in California,
clearly indicate a legislative recognition that the subject matter of
pastoral counseling, though similar to that of lay counseling, has a
religious orientation and that the state is not equipped to ascertain
the competency of such counseling. 117 As for the clergy-penitent
privilege statutes, cleric counseling is the exact type of activity which
these statutes were enacted to protect. Such statutes accord to the
clergy a high degree of respect and trust in contrast to that given to
other vocations.1 18 The counselee is often in pain and needs someone
whom he can trust and respect. 1 9 Thus, as one commentator has
observed, "Would the cleric who insists on a contract, asks for re-
leases, and otherwise insulates himself, be perceived as 'caring' and
'involved' and accepted with 'trust and respect'?" 120 It seems likely
that he would not. Thus, the clergyman-counselee privilege would be
of little value and as a result, the counseling would prove less benefi-
cial to the counselee.
IV. The Pennsylvania Perspective on Clergy Malpractice
A. Constitutional Standards
Article I, section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own con-
sciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or
support any place of worship or to maintain any ministry against
his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, con-
trol or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no preference
shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or
modes of worship. 2 '
To date, there have been no clergy malpractice actions brought in
Pennsylvania. Therefore, any prediction regarding how Pennsylvania
116. See generally Reese, Confidential Communication to the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J.
56 (1963).
117. Ericsson, supra note 29, at 176.
118. Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 542 n.244.
119. Manhood, Helping Patients Cope with Grief, 3 OSTOMY MGMT 14, 15 (1980).
120. See Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 542.
121. PA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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courts would view such actions depends on an analysis of legal prin-
ciples contained in the case law interpreting Article I, section 3. The
provisions of this section were intended to provide Pennsylvania citi-
zens with the religious freedom that had been denied their ancestors
in the countries from which they came. Since the application of the
first amendment of the Federal Constitution to the states, Pennsylva-
nia courts have held that the protection of rights and freedoms se-
cured by this section do not transcend the protection of the first
amendment. Consequently, a focus on the current development of
religious freedom in Pennsylvania necessitates focusing on how the
courts have interpreted the scope of the first amendment as it applies
to Pennsylvania citizens. Thus, a review of the leading Pennsylvania
cases involving issues of religious freedoms which might be raised in
a clergy malpractice action focuses on the first amendment of the
United States Constitution.
In Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania122 a group of
Jehovah's witnesses were convicted under a city ordinance which
prohibited solicitation without a license.'2 3 The Supreme Court
found that the Jehovah's witnesses proselytized their interpretations
of the Bible and their religious beliefs largely through the hand dis-
tribution of literature .1 4 The court found further that this activity is
a combination of both preaching and distribution of religious litera-
ture. The court concluded that this form of religious activity occu-
pies the same "high estate under the first amendment as do[es] wor-
ship in churches and preaching from pulpits," and is entitled to the
same protection.2 The court focused on the sincerity of the Jeho-
vah's witnesses in their religious beliefs and practices "however mis-
guided they may be thought to be.'9 2 6
The sincerity of religious beliefs was again the issue in Africa v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 27 In that case Frank Africa, an
inmate of a Pennsylvania prison and a self-proclaimed minister of
MOVE, argued that the state was required under the religion
clauses of the first amendment to provide him with a special diet
122. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
123. The ordinance involved provided in part "That all persons canvassing for or solicit-
ing said Borough . . .merchandise of any kind shall be required to procure from the Burgess a
license to transact said business. 319 U.S. at 106.
124. 319 U.S. at 108.
125. Id. at 109.
126. Id. Compare with United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), supra notes 74-77
and accompanying text.
127. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1981).
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consisting entirely of raw foods.' 28 In rejecting Mr. Africa's claim,
the court established two threshold requirements that must be met
before particular beliefs, alleged to be religious, are accorded first
amendment protection. A court must decide whether the beliefs are:
1) sincerely held; and 2) religious in nature.12 9 Beliefs are religious
in nature when: 1) fundamental and ultimate questions dealing with
imponderable matters are addressed; 2) the system of beliefs is com-
prehensive in nature; and 3) certain formal and external signs are
present.'8 0
In Africa, the court noted a problem inherent in the analysis it
had established:
It is inappropriate for a reviewing court to judge the truth
or falsity of an announced article of faith . . . . at the same
time we recognize that the very concept of ordered liberty pre-
cludes allowing any person a blanket privilege to make his own
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has
important interests."8 '
Despite this difficulty, the court concluded that the protection of reli-
gion clauses extend only to those claims which satisfy the threshold
requirements.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently applied the thresh-
old requirements of Africa in Wilson v. Schillinger. a2 In Wilson, a
prisoner who was a Rastafarian, brought a civil rights action alleging
that prison officials had interfered with his free exercise of religion
by enforcing hair length regulations against him. 3 a The court found
that the threshold requirements of Africa were met; nevertheless, the
regulation was valid because of the necessity to protect the health
and safety of the prison population.""
In summary, religious beliefs are entitled to first amendment
128. Mr. Africa contended that to eat anything other than raw foods would be a viola-
tion of his religion. 662 F.2d at 1025.
129. Id. at 1030.
130. Id. at 1030-31. Using the analysis the court concluded that the MOVE philosophy
deals with: I) secular matters; 2) lacks a comprehensive theology; and 3) lacks the defining
structural characteristics of a traditional religion. Id. at 1036.
131. Id. at 1030-31.
132. 761 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1985).
133. Mr. Wilson contended that the regulation conflicted with a tenet of his religion that
proscribes members from touching their hair with sharp objects. Id. at 923.
134. Id. at 928. The court accepted the prison's three reasons why the hair regulation
was necessary for purposes of prison security. First, long hair enhances an inmate's ability to
transport contraband. Second, long hair contributes to unsanitary conditions in the prison.
Third, the grooming regulation assists in controlling homosexual activity within the prison
since male inmates with long hair tend to be more attractive to other male inmates. Id. at 926.
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protection when they are sincerely held, religious in nature, and do
not pose a substantial risk to the health and safety of others. Any
evaluation of the content of a clergyman's counsel appears to be the
equivalent of evaluating the clergyman's beliefs, thus these beliefs
are entitled to first amendment protection if they satisfy the princi-
ples outlined above.
It is obvious that clergy counselors of recognized denominations,
such as Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism satisfy Africa's
three criteria regarding the religious nature of their activities. Cleri-
cal counseling, by its nature, deals with ultimate questions of impon-
derable matters such as faith and prayer. The beliefs of these de-
nominations are comprehensive in nature and utilize certain formal
and external signs, such as churches, the Bible, and various other
traditional religious signs.
Even if the clergyman's beliefs are religious in nature, there is
an additional hurdle to overcome before clergy counseling is pro-
tected from governmental intrusion. As was addressed in Wilson and
Africa, the ultimate issue is whether the dangers of clergy counseling
are significant enough to warrant any degree of state intervention.
This issue was addressed in the case of Commonwealth v.
Beiler.3 5 In Beiler, Amish parents refused to send their children to
school beyond the fifth grade in violation of the Pennsylvania Public
School Code.1"0 The parents argued that under the authority of their
religion children should not receive secular education after the age of
fourteen. 317 The Beiler court rejected the parents' argument stating:
Religious liberty includes the absolute right to believe but
only a limited right to act . . . no human authority can in any
case, control or interfere with the rights of conscience ....
[Included in these rights of conscience is] to do or forbear to do
any act for conscience sake, the doing or forbearing of which is
not prejudicial to the public welfare.1 8'
The issue was again raised in Bear v. Reformed Menonite
Church.3 9 In Bear, the plaintiff was excommunicated from the Me-
nonite church for criticizing its teachings and practices. Bear alleged
135. 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951).
136. Pennsylvania law requires that: "Every parent ... of any child or children of com-
pulsory school age [between the ages of eight and seventeen) . . . to send such child or chil-
dren to day school in which the subjects and activities prescribed by the State Council of
Education are taught in the English language." 24 PA. CoNs. STAT. §§ 13-1326, 13-1327.
137. 168 Pa. Super. at 466, 79 A.2d at 136.
138. Id. at 468, 79 A.2d at 137.
139. 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975).
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that the bishops of the church had counseled and encouraged his
wife and others to "shun and boycott" him. As a result of such coun-
sel, Bear alleged that his business collapsed and his wife and chil-
dren refused to speak to him or engage in any physical contact with
him. 140 The court, relying on the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in Sherbert,14 1 found that religious activity threatening to dis-
rupt public safety, order, or peace could be regulated. 42 The court
also suggested, however, that the first amendment may present a
complete and valid defense to the regulation of such conduct.1
43
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Barnhart,14 the Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court affirmed William and Linda Barnhart's conviction for
involuntary manslaughter of their son, Justin. Justin died of cancer
at age two. His parents had relied on God to the exclusion of modern
medicine to cure Justin's cancer. 45 The court reasoned that the
state's interest in protecting its citizens, such as a two-year old boy
who was unable to speak on his own behalf, outweighs the free exer-
cise of the parents' religion. The court emphasized, however, that
liability attached not to the parents' decision for themselves but
rather to their decision for their child, which effectively forfeited his
life.' 4"
These cases indicate that the issue in clergy malpractice may be
whether the counseling, in some circumstances, endangers the wel-
fare of individuals or the public to a degree warranting state regula-
tion. First, it is difficult to imagine an instance where a person seek-
ing the counsel of a clergyman would pose enough of a threat to
society as to warrant state intervention. People should have the lib-
erty to seek counsel from the clergyman of their choice and the state
should not interfere with this decision. Further, in the cases outlined
above, the activity of the person involved was judicially examined,
not their underlying beliefs. In contrast, the very task of defining a
standard of care for pastoral counseling will involve courts in a spiri-
140. Id. at 332, 341 A.2d at 106-07.
141. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For a discussion of the Sherbert decision, see supra note 90,
and accompanying text.
142. The court stated that interference with the maintenance of marriage and the alien-
ation of affection and tortious interference with business relationships may be conduct of para-
mount state concern. If so, courts may have authority to regulate religious counsel which has
such a deleterious effect despite the strictures of the first amendment. 462 Pa. at 334, 341
A.2d at 107.
143. Id. at 335, 340 A.2d at 108.
144. 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985).
145. The pastor of the parents' church testified that the position of the church was that
Justin's spiritual or eternal salvation was of far greater importance than his physical well-
being. Id. at 20, 497 A.2d at 621.
146. Id. at 26, 497 A.2d at 624.
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tual or doctrinal inquiry.147 The religious impetus and content of the
counsel is inseparable from the giving of the counsel."' 8 Thus, as the
Bear court suggested, the first amendment would permit a "complete
and valid defense" in clergy malpractice actions.4 9
There is yet another constitutional issue which may arise in a
clergy malpractice action. In Springfield School District v. Depart-
ment of Education'"0 a three-prong test was derived to evaluate the
constitutionality of state actions in light of the establishment clause.
In this case, several school districts refused to follow a Pennsyl-
vania statute authorizing local school districts to provide for the free
transportation of pupils to and from nonpublic schools. The school
districts claimed that the statute was unconstitutional because it re-
quired impermissible involvement between the state and religion. In
rejecting the school districts' claim, the court recognized that state
action is not violative of the establishment clause if it meets three
requirements.' 5' First, the state action must reflect a clear, legisla-
tive purpose. Second, it must have a primary effect which neither
advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the action must avoid excessive
government entanglement with religion. 
15
The Springfield test was further developed in Bender v. Wil-
liamsport Area School District'53 and Christian School Association
v. Commonwealth, Department of Labor.'" In Bender, a group of
students at a public high school attempted to form a student organi-
zation devoted to prayer and other religious activities within the high
school. The students planned to meet during the regularly scheduled
student activity period. Fearing violation of the establishment clause,
school officials refused to allow the students to meet. 55 The court
reiterated the Springfield test and held that because the school
147. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
148. See Comment, Clergy Malpractice, supra note 25, at 540.
149. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
150. 483 Pa. 539, 397 A.2d 1154 (1979).
151. The court relied on Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) for the test it enun-
ciated. The Lemon court stated that: "In order to determine whether the government's entan-
glement with religion is excessive, it must examine the character and purposes of the institu-
tions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the state provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and the religious authority." 403 U.S. at 615. See 483
Pa. at 552, 397 A.2d at 1167. See also supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
152. 483 Pa. at 550-51, 397 A.2d at 1165-67. The court concluded that the statute
under consideration conferred no greater benefits upon non-public school students than upon
those attending public schools, so the Act is totally unrelated to the religious mission of the
non-public schools. Id. at 557, 397 A.2d at 1169.
153. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986).
154. 55 Pa. Commw. 555, 423 A.2d 1340 (1980).
155. 741 F.2d at 541.
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board's restrictions were content-based (i.e. permission was denied
solely because their activity was religiously oriented), the board was
required to demonstrate that its denial of permission was narrowly
drawn to meet compelling state interests. 5 The court concluded
that allowing the students' activity during the hours of mandatory
attendance would promote an impermissible atmosphere of religious
partisanship in the school, and thus was a violation of the establish-
ment clause.
1 57
In Christian School Association, five private religious groups
appealed from decisions of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor
and Industry which determined that each school was subject to the
provisions of the state's unemployment compensation law and that
each school should therefore be assessed unemployment contribu-
tions. The schools claimed that they were exempt under Pennsylva-
nia law as religious organizations. In finding the schools exempt, the
court held that whether a law unconstitutionally infringes upon the
free exercise of religion depends largely upon the degree to which
the law imposes a direct burden or a severe but indirect burden upon
an individual's ability to practice his religion.' 58
Analysis of a clergy malpractice action in light of these cases
indicates that such an action would be violative of a clergyman's
constitutional rights. The state, in establishing a standard and duties
for a clergyman would first be required to show it had a clearly leg-
islative purpose. It would also have to convincingly present evidence
that the counseling in question was violative of a compelling state
interest. The state's interest in preserving peace and good order
might be classified as compelling. 159 It is doubtful, however, that a
court could justify a finding that counseling is subversive to the
state's interests in peace and order.
In addition, it is unlikely that a clergy malpractice action would
be allowable under the remaining two prongs of the Springfield test.
Such an action would inhibit religion because by establishing a stan-
156. Id. at 550. The court found that: "The interest of the school in complying with its
Constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling." Id. at 550 (emphasis supplied
by the court).
157. Id. at 561.
158. 55 Pa. Commw. at 561, 423 A.2d at 1344. The court also held that if the purpose
or effect of a law is to discriminate invidiously between religion, that law is constitutionally
invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. Id. at 562, 423
A.2d at 1347,
159. See In Re Appeal of Open Door Baptist Church, 63 Pa. Commw. 292, 437 A.2d
1291 (1981) (an imposition of a tax on property that is not actually used for religious purposes
does not interfere with the free exercise of religion).
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dard of conduct for the clergy, the state would be forced to review
the training and skills of individual counselors. The review would in-
terfere with the church's decision-making ability as to the supervi-
sion of counselors. State judgments would have to be made as to
obligations based on doctrinal beliefs. This would inevitably lead to
the state's second-guessing decisions by clergymen as to whether
they should have been more or less available to the counselee. Fur-
ther, established standards of care for the clergymen would be incon-
sistent, depending upon such variables as the size of the church's
congregation and the staff trained for counseling.160
Under current medical malpractice law in Pennsylvania, courts
employ a standard of skill and knowledge of that possessed and em-
ployed by physicians generally in the same or similar locality, giving
due regard to the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment.1 This standard could not successfully be applied in the
context of clergy malpractice actions because a duty owed to a per-
son seeking counsel might be different depending upon the coun-
selor's ecclesiastical office.1 62 Further, a clergyman who lives in a ru-
ral area might not be held to the same standard as one who lives in a
metropolitan area. Moreover, the implications that an established
standard of care would have on expert witnesses is equally unclear.
Is a Catholic Bishop an expert witness if a priest or cardinal is sued?
Can a protestant pastor testify against a rabbi?
Finally, the state in a clergy malpractice action would be in-
volved in excessive government entanglement with religion by delv-
ing into the depth of training in the Scripture that a counselor had
and whether the training was adequate to deal with the specific na-
ture of the problem at hand. Further, many religious counselors con-
sider their competence to be measured by spiritual gifts.' 63 Faced
with having to decide if someone with a number of spiritual gifts
should be held to a higher standard than someone with fewer gifts
would be so difficult for a court that it may decide to apply secular
criteria such as those of clinical psychology. However, since cleric
160. Ericsson, Clergy Malpractice: An Illegal Legal Theory, Focus (1986) at 14 [here-
inafter Ericsson, An Illegal Legal Theory].
161. See generally B. Appel. The Professional Liability of Physicians in Pennsylvania,
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY/PENNSYLVANIA BAR INSTITUTE No. 1981-178 (March 1982). (For
an in-depth analysis of professional malpractice in the state of Pennsylvania.)
162. See supra note 37.
163. Ericsson, An Illegal Legal Theory, supra note 160, at 16. Scripture indicates that
spiritual counseling is the work of the Holy Spirit and that effective counseling can not be done
apart from the Holy Spirit. The Spirit endows each believer with a spiritual gift or gifts, some
of which may have a direct bearing on the counselor's ability and effectiveness. Id. See also
John 14:16, 17; Ephesians 4:7-13; Romans 12:3-8; I Corinthians 12:1-11.
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counseling involves religious insights into daily problems, a secular
standard would be improper."" Further, since there are many vary-
ing psychoanalytical doctrines, a court would have great difficulty in
choosing which ought to be applied to the clergy.
B. Pennsylvania's Clergy-Penitent Privilege
Pennsylvania law provides for a clergy-penitent privilege. The
law states:
No clergyman, priest, rabbi or minister of the gospel of any
regularly established church or religious organization, except
clergymen or ministers who are self-ordained or who are mem-
bers of religious organizations in which members other than the
leader thereof are deemed clergymen or ministers, who while in
the course of his duties has acquired information from any per-
son secretly and in confidence, shall be compelled or allowed
without consent of such persons to disclose that information in
any legal proceeding, trial, or investigation before any govern-
ment unit.165
Pennsylvania's clergy-penitent privilege raises the issue of
whether a clergy malpractice action would place a cleric in a posi-
tion where he must choose between liability and violating the confi-
dentiality of a penitent's communications. Further, a clergy malprac-
tice action would involve a violation of this specific legislative
enactment. This privilege recognizes and protects the individual's
need to confess matters to the clergy free from the fear that the
matter will ever be disclosed to others."' The statute represents soci-
ety's decision that the law will not compel a clergyman to violate the
tenets of his church which require him to maintain secrecy as to
confidential statements made to him in the course of his religious
duties. As stated earlier, if a clergy malpractice action were adopted
by the courts, the clergy would feel pressure to disclose to the family
or others the content of discussions with a counselee that the coun-
selee believed to be confidential. 6 As a practical matter, effective
counseling by the clergy would be destroyed. 66
164. Ericsson, An Illegal Legal Theory, supra note 160, at 16.
165. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 ( ).
166. See Ericsson, An Illegal Legal Theory, supra note 160, at 18.
167. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
168. See Ericsson, An Illegal Legal Theory, supra note 160, at 19.
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V. Conclusion
The theory of clergy malpractice, which would hold clergymen
liable for the effects of allegedly negligent advice is an unconstitu-
tional intrusion into the religious freedoms of the clergy. Pastoral
counseling is fundamentally a religious activity. The first amendment
safeguards the free exercise of such activity. The imposition of estab-
lished standards of care and resulting duties would amount to state
control, review, and interference in a counselor's practice of his or
her religion. Such excessive involvement by the state would also be
repugnant to the establishment clause of the first amendment. The
giving of clerical guidance is not an activity disruptive of the public
peace or welfare. Pennsylvania's constitutional law as well as its leg-
islative enactment recognizing a clergy-penitent privilege have firmly
established safeguards which should protect a clergyman from the
threat of a clergy malpractice action.
Michael J. Fiorillo

